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DISRUPTING THE EVICTION CRISIS WITH CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION STRATEGIES 
Deborah Thompson Eisenberg* and Noam Ebner** 
I think the courts should give the tenants an option to 
tell their story. A lot of people get in those situations; 
you don't know how they got there. I don't think 
people are just sitting around not paying rent just to 
not be paying rent, you know?1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Our nation faces a serious eviction epidemic. More than 2.3 
million eviction actions are filed every year.2 That equates to about 
four per minute.3 The eviction crisis is a multi-faceted problem that 
will require a systemic, interdisciplinary approach. Studies have 
found “a complex combination of financial, social, relational and 
health factors contributes to the inability to pay rent.”4 The causes 
of the crisis include, among other things, poverty, increasing rents, 
decreasing wages, and vanishing affordable housing.5 Evictions not 
 
2.  While there is no centralized data collection about eviction rates, the 
Eviction Lab at Princeton University estimates that millions of families are 
evicted every year. The Eviction Lab has developed a database to assist 
policymakers in understanding the scope of the problem. National Estimates: 
Evictions in America, THE EVICTION LAB (May 11, 2018), 
https://evictionlab.org/national-estimates/. See also Terry Gross, First-Ever 
Evictions Database Shows: “We’re in the Middle of a Housing Crisis,” NAT’L 
PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 12, 2018, 1:07 PM ET), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/04/12/601783346/first-ever-evictions-database-
shows-were-in-the-middle-of-a-housing-crisis.   
3.  THE EVICTION LAB, supra note 2. 
4.  Marleke Holl et al., Interventions to Prevent Tenant Evictions: A 
Systematic Review, 24 HEALTH & SOC. CARE COMMUNITY 532, 533 (2016). 
5.  Matthew Desmond & Carl Gershenson, Who Gets Evicted? Assessing 
Individual, Neighborhood, and Network Factors, 62 SOC. SCI. RES. 362 (2017). 
Most of the families pushed out of their homes due to poverty include children, 
and Black mothers are disproportionately impacted. MATTHEW DESMOND, 
MACARTHUR FOUNDATION, POL’Y RES. BRIEF, POOR BLACK WOMEN ARE 
EVICTED AT ALARMING RATES, SETTING OFF A CHAIN OF HARDSHIP 2 (2014), 
https://www.macfound.org/media/files/HHM_Research_Brief_Poor_Black_Wo
men_Are_Evicted_at_Alarming_Rates.pdf.  A Baltimore study of three hundred 
renters who came to Rent Court revealed the following statistics: 79% identified 
as women; 94% as African American/Black; 60% reported a household size of 
two to four persons and 65% housed at least one minor child in the rented unit. 
PUB. JUSTICE CTR., JUSTICE DIVERTED: HOW RENTERS ARE PROCESSED IN THE 
BALTIMORE CITY RENT COURT 12 (2015) [hereinafter JUSTICE DIVERTED]. 
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only result from poverty,6 they exacerbate poverty.7 Evictions are 
traumatic experiences, especially for children, that can devastate 
communities.8  
This urgent problem is not new. Many decades ago, scholars and 
tenant advocates sounded an alarm about the growing eviction 
problem.9 Fast-forward to 2020, and the eviction epidemic persists, 
as do the scathing criticisms of the legal process as an expedited 
“housed-to-homeless pipeline.” 10  One study in Baltimore, for 
example, described the city’s “rent court” as a “broken system” that 
puts “long-standing tenant protections and basic housing standards 
second to landlords’ bottom line.”11  
Jurisdictions across the country are attacking the problem in 
different ways. Some have increased legal protections for tenants.12 
Recognizing that legal rights are meaningless unless asserted in 
court, some cities now guarantee legal counsel for all tenants facing 
 
6.  According to the Eviction Lab, “most poor renting families spend at least 
half of their income on housing costs, with one in four of those families spending 
over 70 percent of their income just on rent and utilities.”  Why Eviction Matters, 
THE EVICTION LAB, https://evictionlab.org/why-eviction-matters/#affordable-
housing-crisis (last visited Mar. 27, 2020). 
7.  MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE 
AMERICAN CITY 296 (2016). As Matthew Desmond describes: “eviction does not 
simply drop poor families into a dark valley, a trying yet relatively brief detour 
on life’s journey. It fundamentally redirects their way, casting them onto a 
different, and much more difficult, path. Eviction is a cause, not just a condition, 
of poverty.” Id. at 298-99. See also Matthew Desmond, Eviction and the 
Reproduction of Urban Poverty, 118 AM. J. SOC. 88 (2012). 
8.  DESMOND, supra note 7, at 298 (describing impact of evictions on 
communities, including higher violent crime and lack of neighborhood 
instability); Philip M.E. Garboden, Tama Leventhal& Sandra Newman, 
Estimating the Effects of Residential Mobility: A Methodological Note, 43 J. SOC. 
SERV. RES. 246 (2017); Holl et al., supra note 4, at 533. 
9.  See Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and 
Subordination of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
533 (1992). 
10.  JUSTICE DIVERTED, supra note 5, at 6.  
11. Id. 
12.  Legal reforms include caps on the amount of rent or security deposits 
that can be charged, limits on rental increases, and “just cause” eviction laws. See 
Justice Innovation, STANFORD LEGAL DESIGN LAB, 
https://justiceinnovation.law.stanford.edu/resources/maps/eviction/#limit (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2020) (summarizing legal limits on landlords).  
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eviction. 13  Others call for increased affordable housing or 
recognition of housing as a basic human right.14   
While these reforms are helpful, the ongoing eviction crisis 
should teach us that traditional legal approaches alone are not likely 
to make a meaningful difference. While some tenants have 
cognizable legal defenses, others do not. For a variety of reasons, 
they simply cannot afford to pay rent. In these cases, tenants may 
need something that a judge cannot give them: additional time, a 
payment plan, additional resources, or flexible options to keep them 
housed.15  
Some states have experimented with proactive eviction 
prevention programs that combine mediation and problem-solving 
processes with legal advice and other types of rental assistance.16 
These programs connect tenants with available resources before 
they fall behind on their rent, and facilitate ongoing communication 
and conflict resolution between renters and property owners. In 
addition to pre-filing interventions, some courts offer mediation 
programs to help parties negotiate agreements to prevent eviction 
and address housing issues.   
This article explores the potential benefits and challenges of 
using mediation and other conflict resolution approaches as part of 
comprehensive plan to disrupt the eviction crisis. Although not a 
panacea, early conflict interventions and mediation services may be 
valuable components of a multi-faceted eviction prevention 
strategy, especially when offered early—long before an eviction 
filing—and integrated with legal advice and other supportive 
services. 
 
13.  See Jared Brey, Is Tenants’ Right to Counsel on Its Way to Becoming a 
Standard Practice?, NEXT CITY (Dec. 10, 2019), 
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/is-tenants-right-to-counsel-on-its-way-to-
becoming-standard-practice (discussing right to counsel laws in New York City, 
Cleveland, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Newark). The vast majority of 
tenants appear without counsel in housing court, but studies have shown that legal 
representation dramatically increases their chances of keeping their homes. D. 
James Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak & Jonathan Hennessy, The Limits of 
Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District 
Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901 (2013); Carroll Seron 
et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New York 
City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 419 (2001). 
14.  Lisa T. Alexander, Evicted: The Socio-Legal Case for the Right to 
Housing, 126 YALE L.J. F. 431 (2017). The call for recognition of housing as a 
basic human right finds support in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
see G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone 
has the right to a standard of living adequate for health and well-being of himself 
and his family, including . . . housing.”). 
15.  See infra Part II. 
16.  See infra Parts III and IV. 
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II. MEDIATION IN THE “RENT COURT”  
The legal procedure for evictions, known as summary ejectment 
or unlawful detainer, has been criticized as an expedited, state-
sanctioned collection process for landlords in which tenants are 
voiceless and powerless.17 Eviction cases typically proceed on a 
rapid timeline—much faster than other civil cases. 18  In many 
jurisdictions, hearings occur in about a week’s time, leaving little to 
no opportunity for tenants to seek legal advice or rental assistance, 
or even file a written defense to the action.19 An eviction docket can 
include hundreds or even thousands of cases a day.20 Although the 
majority of tenants do not appear, 21  the courtroom typically is 
crowded and chaotic.22  
The legal issue in an eviction proceeding is repossession of the 
property due to the failure to pay rent. Most tenants lack awareness 
of their legal rights and do not have an attorney. Self-represented 
tenants who have cognizable legal defenses to an eviction may be 
afraid to raise them in the intimidating atmosphere of a courtroom.23 
Even if they speak up, studies have found that tenants who attempt 
to tell their stories about substandard housing conditions or 
 
17.  JUSTICE DIVERTED, supra note 5, at vi; Bezdek, supra note 9, at 565. See 
also Rebecca Gale, Why Landlords File for Eviction (Hint: It’s Usually Not to 
Evict), CITY LAB (June 18, 2019), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/06/eviction-notice-process-rental-
landlords-collect-late-rent/591553/ (“[F]iling for eviction turns tenants into 
chastened debtors, giving landlords additional leverage to deter them from 
complaining about a code violation or mistreatment. In courts, late rent takes 
precedence over unmade repairs and other issues.”). 
18.  See generally Megan E. Hatch, Statutory Protection for Renters: 
Classification of State Landlord-Tenant Policy Approaches, 27 HOUSING POL’Y 
DEBATE 98 (2017) (providing a review and taxonomy of various state and local 
legal approaches to the landlord-tenant relationship); Eviction Process by State: 
A 50-Stater Nationwide Overview, VERTICAL RENT (Oct. 31, 2018), 
https://www.verticalrent.com/entry/eviction-process-by-state-a-50-stater-
nationwide-overview. 
19.  JUSTICE DIVERTED, supra note 5, at 5-7 (describing Baltimore’s rapid 
timeline for summary ejectment, in which tenants are served with process in two 
to four days and trial occurs within five to ten days).  
20.  Id. at 46-47 (showing that in Baltimore City, for example, a daily failure-
to-pay rent docket usually includes a shocking 1,000 cases). 
21.  DESMOND, supra note 7, at 96 (describing the default rate in eviction 
actions across various states and cities ranges from 35% to more than 90%); see 
also Randy Gerchick, No Easy Way Out: Making the Summary Eviction Process 
a Fairer and More Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L. REV. 
759 (1994); see also Erick Larson, Case Characteristics and Defendant Tenant 
Default in a Housing Court, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 3 (2006). 
22.  JUSTICE DIVERTED, supra note 5, at 21 (describing that participants in 
rent court characterize process as “chaotic”); see also DESMOND, supra note 7, at 
95-99 (describing eviction court at a Milwaukee county courthouse). 
23.  Bezdek, supra note 9, at 560-61. 
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temporary financial hardships are effectively silenced by the court.24 
No matter how empathetic judges may be to the tenant’s 
circumstances on a human level, the reason the tenant cannot pay 
the rent often has no legal consequence. In most cases, the judge 
asks whether the tenant agrees that the rent is due and unpaid.25 
Many tenants respond “yes, but . . . ” At that point, the court 
typically interrupts the tenant and takes but a few minutes26 to sign 
an eviction order, putting the tenant on a path to homelessness.27   
It is questionable whether an ethically sound and quality 
mediation process can, and more importantly should,28 be integrated 
into a legal process widely criticized as broken, unjust, and pro-
landlord. Mediation may have little efficacy when tenants face such 
grave consequences and have limited financial and housing options. 
Providing mediation when the tenant is on the brink of homelessness 
and lacks legal counsel is fraught with fairness concerns and process 
dangers. 29  In addition, the landlord’s investment in the eviction 
process, and high likelihood of prevailing in court, diminishes their 
flexibility in last-minute negotiations. 
Nevertheless, in appropriate cases, day-of-trial mediation may 
help some tenants avoid eviction and obtain other benefits, 
especially as compared to outcomes of summary ejectment 
adjudication. As described below, mediation may help tenants reach 
agreements that include flexible payment plans, reductions in the 
amount owed, specific timelines for repairs, a delayed move out 
date, or additional time to find new housing. Mediation also helps 
tenants to avoid an eviction judgment on their record that could 
affect future rental opportunities. 
Likewise, mediation may allow property owners to avoid the 
hassle and expense involved with court filings and tenant turnover.30 
 
24.  Id. at 586-90; see also JUSTICE DIVERTED, supra note 5, at 29 (noting 
that “rent court” judges discouraged tenants from raising “any issue other than 
whether they had paid the specific amount of money the landlord alleged was 
owed”).  
25.  JUSTICE DIVERTED, supra note 5, at 34. 
26.  Bezdek, supra note 9, at 586. 
27.  See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-401(e) (2019) (noting that 
after a judgment, many jurisdictions allow tenants to “redeem” the property by 
paying the rent owed, plus additional court costs and fees, to prevent an eviction).  
28.  See Noam Ebner & Sharon Press, Eviction Mediation: An International 
Conversation Followed by Five More, 41 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & 
PRAC., Symposium Issue No. 3 (2019) (discussing the wisdom of involving 
mediation in these proceedings, given inherent ethical challenges as well as the 
concern that mediation activity might allow courts or legislatures to avoid the 
need to make systemic change). 
29.  Id.  
30.  See Casey Schwab, Landlord Tenant Mediation: A Modern Approach to 
Tenant Issues, AVAIL (Sept. 16, 2019), 
https://www.avail.co/education/articles/landlord-tenant-mediation-a-modern-
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Although often portrayed as the villain in this story, most landlords 
do not want to be perceived as the “bad guy.” 31  Even property 
owners who sympathize with a tenant’s financial predicament and 
comply with all housing standards simply cannot sustain a business 
when unpaid rent accrues. Some landlords attempt to work with 
tenants who experience sudden financial hardship and delay filing 
for eviction as long as possible.32  
While larger property management companies can build 
eviction expenses into their business models, the eviction process 
can be especially burdensome and costly for smaller “mom-and-
pop” landlords who operate rent-check-to-mortgage-payment.33 To 
pursue an eviction action, landlords must pay a case filing fee, 
potentially hire an attorney, and incur additional fees for the actual 
eviction. The landlord then must prepare the property for a new 
renter and advertise for a new tenant. Given these costs, some 
landlords go so far as to pay tenants simply to leave the premises 
and return the keys without paying the rent, known as “cash for 
keys.”34  
Given these dynamics, there may be a window of opportunity 
for day-of-trial mediation in the eviction context, particularly in 
cases involving smaller landlords who have a longer relationship 
with a particular tenant. As described below, the benefits may 
include a greater sense of voice, broader remedial options, and 
increased flexibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
approach-to-tenant-issues (describing potential benefits of mediation for 
landlords). But see JUSTICE DIVERTED, supra note 5, at 4 (noting that compared 
to other types of civil small claims litigation, however, summary ejectment cases 
are less burdensome, with lower filing fees, expedited timelines, and other 
advantages for the landlord. This ease of filing may be one of the reasons that 
summary ejectment cases are the single largest type of case on the court dockets 
in many states).  
31.  See Bert Stratton, Opinion, I’m Not Evil. I’m a Landlord, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/12/opinion/im-not-evil-im-
a-landlord.html. 
32.  DESMOND, supra note 7, at 38-39 (describing landlord who worked with 
tenants and did not evict most tenants who owed back rent). 
33.  See Pam Fessler, Low-Income Renters Squeezed Between Too-High 
Rents and Subpar Housing, NAT’L PUB. RADIO MORNING EDITION (Mar. 30, 
2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/03/30/471347546/low-income-renters-
squeezed-between-too-high-rents-and-subpar-housing (quoting landlords who 
say they need the rent to pay for mortgage, tax bills, and repairs). 
34.  See LEWIS, supra note 1, at Findings: Landlords, 
http://evictions.cura.umn.edu/news/findings-landlords (describing “cash for 
keys”). 
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A. Voice 
Having a sense of voice—or opportunity to tell one’s story—has 
been found to be a vital component of procedural justice.35 Studies 
have found that tenants lack a sense of voice in the eviction legal 
process, which focuses predominantly on the landlord’s claim for 
unpaid rent and discourages defenses by the tenant.36 As described 
by one tenant:  
The only question they [judges in eviction cases] ask 
you is, “So you agree with the amount that’s owed?” 
Like they don’t, you know, take the time to get your 
side of the story or to see. . . why you haven’t paid 
anything, or if there’s anything wrong with the 
property.37 
In her study of the many ways that the eviction process silences 
tenants, Professor Barbara Bezdek observed that judges frequently 
ask tenants, “Is there anything else you wish to tell me?” Tenants 
typically respond with “a human story which is not given legal 
credence.” 38  When tenants attempt to explain the reasons for 
nonpayment of rent, “[t]he judge either waits through the story or 
interrupts it, but at either point, tells the tenant that her remarks are 
irrelevant, and orders judgment for the landlord.” 39  Professor 
Bezdek characterized the court’s silencing of tenant’s personal 
stories as the result of a “rule-oriented” rather than “relation-
oriented” account of disputes.40 
Unlike the expedited, inflexible court proceeding, mediation 
offers a relational, problem-solving process. One of the most 
important benefits of mediation as compared to adjudication is the 
opportunity for parties to tell their stories directly to the mediator 
and the opposing side. Unlike judges, who must rule based solely on 
 
35.  See, e.g., E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: 
Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952, 957 (1990) (finding that “voice with the 
possibility of influence . . . leads to even greater perceived fairness”); Tom R. 
Tyler et al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with Leaders: Exploring the 
Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 72, 80 (1985) 
(finding voice heightens perception of procedural justice). See also Nancy A. 
Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from Procedural 
and Social Justice Theories, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49 (2004). 
36.  See supra notes 5 and 9 and accompanying text. 
37.  JUSTICE DIVERTED, supra note 5, at 34. 
38.  Bezdek, supra note 9, at 586. 
39.  Id. 
40.  Id. at 586-87 (citing John M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, Rules Versus 
Relationships in Small Claims Disputes, in CONFLICT TALK: SOCIOLINGUISTIC 
INVESTIGATIONS OF ARGUMENTS IN CONVERSATIONS 178 (Allen D. Grimshaw 
ed., 1990)).  
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evidence relevant to the legal claims at issue (i.e., the failure to pay 
rent), under most mediation frameworks practiced in small claims 
court, the mediators attempt to identify all issues that are important 
to all parties.41 While relational issues tend to be irrelevant in a 
courtroom, they often constitute the heart and soul of the 
conversation in a mediation session. Lon Fuller described this as 
mediation’s “capacity to reorient the parties toward each other, not 
by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new 
and shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will 
redirect their attitudes and dispositions toward one another.”42  
Studies of civil small claims mediation programs generally have 
found positive outcomes for the parties.43 Research in the eviction 
mediation context is more limited, but likewise finds benefits. For 
example, a review of an ADR pilot program in the Baltimore City 
rent division found that both tenants and landlords reported a 
generally positive view of the experience on post-mediation 
evaluations.44 The vast majority of participants reported that they 
felt heard by the other side (83%);45 had enough time to say what 
they wanted to say (92%);46 discussed all of the issues that brought 
 
41.  As Craig McEwen and Richard Maiman describe, mediation is based on 
principles of participation and consent. Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, 
Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237 
(1981). The mediator “encourages the parties to find a mutually agreeable 
settlement by helping them to sharpen the issues, reduce misunderstandings, 
establish priorities, vent emotions, find points of agreement, and ultimately, 
negotiate an agreement.” Id. at 238. 
42.  Lon L. Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 
305, 325 (1971). 
43.  See Lorig Charkoudian, Deborah Thompson Eisenberg & Jamie L. 
Walter, What Difference Does ADR Make? Comparison of ADR and Trial 
Outcomes in Small Claims Court, 35 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 7 (2017) (finding that 
parties who participated in ADR reported significant immediate and long-term 
benefits as compared to parties who proceeded to trial without ADR, including: 
improved party attitudes and relationship with each other; increased sense of 
empowerment and voice; increased likelihood of parties taking responsibility for 
the dispute; increased party satisfaction with the judiciary; and decreased 
predicted probability of returning to court in next year); Roselle L. Wissler, 
Mediation and Adjudication in the Small Claims Court: The Effects of Process 
and Case Characteristics, 29 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 323 (1995). 
44.  CENTER FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, UNIV. OF MARYLAND FRANCIS KING 
CAREY SCHOOL OF LAW (C-DRUM), REPORT ON THE 2016 RENT COURT ADR 
PILOT FOR THE DISTRICT COURT OF MARYLAND IN BALTIMORE CITY (2017), 
https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&c
ontext=cdrum_fac_pubs. 
45.  Id. at 32-33. 
46.  Id. at 27-28. Out of 55 respondents, 50 agreed or strongly agreed that 
they had enough time to say what they wanted to say (92%), with nearly half 
(47%) strongly agreeing.  
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them to court (88%);47 did not feel pressured to reach an agreement 
(81%);48 would recommend the ADR process to others (86%);49 
were satisfied with the mediation (89%);50 and were glad that ADR 
services are available (85%).51  
The narrative comments that parties shared on their evaluations 
during the rent court ADR pilot confirmed the sense of voice 
evidenced in the data above. They included, for example: 
● This was a very easy process, it allowed me to speak with 
the other party in a relaxed setting[.] 
● Both parties can speak. 
● I learn’t about the tennant’s circumstances and 
resources available to help [.] 
● Calming effect on parties to discuss all issues[.] 
● Sitting at a table sometimes puts people at ease 
● It was helpful to have a neutral third party hear our case. 
● [I]t was good to be able to express differences in a 
controlled environment[.] 
● It’s helpful to get people to open up and work things 
out[.] 
● It’s a more compassionate way to settle differences[.]52 
 
During the ADR pilot, 81% of the cases referred to mediation 
reached an agreement.53 Eighty-five percent of respondents agreed 
that the agreement met their needs.54  Although mediation programs 
should not be evaluated based on settlement rates alone, the 
Maryland District Court ADR Program reports that failure-to-pay 
rent cases have the second highest settlement rate in mediation of all 
civil cases mediated in the statewide ADR program.55  
While mediation may provide a sense of voice to some parties, 
this may not, on its own, warrant the establishment of eviction 
mediation programs. This would reinforce the perception some have 
of mediation as a “feel good” process that does not deliver bottom-
 
47.  Id. at 28-29. The vast majority of participants, 88% (47), “agreed” or 
“strongly agreed” with the statement: “We discussed all the issues that brought us 
here.” Id. at 29. There were five participants, however, who strongly disagreed 
with that statement. Id. 
48.  Id. at 29. 
49.  Id. at 30. 
50.  Id. at 31-32. 
51.  Id. at 34. 
52.  Id. at 34-35.  
53.  Thirty out of thirty-seven mediated cases reached agreement, twenty-
three of which were “full” agreements and seven were “partial” agreements. Id. 
at 5. 
54.  Id. at 31. 
55. Mediation in the Rent Court, DISTRICT COURT OF MARYLAND, 
https://mdcourts.gov/district/adr/home/rentcourt (last visited Mar. 25, 2020). 
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line benefits. Therefore, we must consider the fundamental question 
of whether mediation leads to positive outcomes for the parties, as 
well as the valid concern that tenants face the risk of exploitation in 
the mediation process.56   
B. Day-of-Trial Eviction Mediation Programs  
While research is limited, day-of-trial eviction mediation 
programs have been associated with positive outcomes. A study of 
a non-profit mediation program in Boston summary process cases 
found that mediation resulted in better overall results for tenants as 
compared to either court adjudication or a “hallway deal” with the 
landlord or its agent.57 Notably, while adjudication always resulted 
in an eviction order, mediation averted this outcome in some cases.58 
While tenants lost all counterclaims asserted in the adjudicated 
cases, landlords agreed to reduce or waive rent in 10.8% of mediated 
cases due to housing conditions, and forgave or reduced back rent if 
the tenant moved out by a certain date. 59  Mediated agreements 
included other terms that could not be awarded by the court, such as 
positive references for future housing.60 
A study of a mediation program conducted by a grassroots anti-
poverty housing program in Northampton, Massachusetts likewise 
found that on the whole tenants fared considerably better in 
mediation than they did in court or informal settlements without 
mediation. The mediated agreements included payment plans in 
more than half of the mediated cases (58.8%), processes to maintain 
 
56.  For articles about the potential risks of mediation for marginalized 
parties, see, e.g., Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the 
Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359; 
Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE 
L.J. 1545 (1991).  
57.  Joel Kurtzberg & Jamie Henikoff, Freeing the Parties from the Law: 
Designing an Interest and Rights Focused Model of Landlord/Tenant Mediation, 
1997 J. DISP. RESOL. 53, 97-98. 
58.  While the landlord was awarded possession in 100% of the adjudicated 
cases, with no abatement of the rent and no order for repairs, 10.8% of the 
mediated agreements stated that the tenant would regain possession if the payment 
plan was fulfilled or if other conditions were met (including one agreement in 
which possession was contingent on the tenant entering an alcohol treatment 
program). Id. at 98-99. 
59.  Id. at 99. 
60. Additional tenant benefits included the following examples: 
[O]ne landlord agreed to let the tenant store her furniture and 
boxes in a locked attic room. Another landlord agreed to speak 
to the other tenants in the building and request that they keep 
noise levels to a minimum when the defendant/tenant was in the 
building. One agreement even contained a provision stating that 
the tenant could avoid eviction by entering an alcohol 
rehabilitation program.  
Id.  
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housing (41.2%), rent abatement (23.5%), and landlord agreements 
for repairs (9.8%).61 Similarly, the 2017 review of the Baltimore 
City rent court ADR pilot found that 45% of the mediated 
agreements included a payment plan, 30% addressed living 
conditions and agreements to perform repairs, and 35% mentioned 
actions other than the rent or living conditions.62 
Most poor tenants lack negotiation leverage in eviction cases, 
especially when they have no cognizable legal defenses to the non-
payment of rent.63 Even in these circumstances, however, mediators 
can assist the parties in negotiating a payment plan so tenants may 
remain in stable housing. A day-of-trial eviction mediation program 
in Franklin County, Ohio reports that it has “helped more than 3,500 
residents annually avoid losing their homes through eviction.”64 The 
program states that mediation “is especially critical for tenants who 
have no legal defense, as their only hope of getting a pending 
eviction rescinded is if they work out a voluntary resolution with 
their landlord in mediation.”65  
If the tenant agrees to vacate the property during mediation, the 
parties can agree to a specific move-out date, providing the tenant 
additional time to secure new housing. Although the tenant may 
agree to vacate the property, a negotiated timeline for the move is 
far less traumatic than having an armed sheriff forcibly remove a 
family’s belongings. Additional time may help the family to identify 
alternative living situations. Importantly, a mediated agreement 
allows tenants to avoid an eviction judgment on their record. With 
the wide accessibility of court records, some property owners bar 
tenants based simply on a record of a prior eviction filing record, 
even if the case was ultimately dismissed or if the tenant prevailed.66 
To address this problem, some states allow the parties to agree to 
expungement of any record of the initial eviction filing. 
 
61.  Id. at 109. 
62.  C-DRUM, supra note 44, at 15-19. 
63.  Of course, tenants need a lawyer or at least basic legal information to 
understand whether they have any defenses. As described infra, some eviction 
prevention programs combine the provision of legal advice with mediation 
services. 
64.  Housing Stabilization and Homelessness Prevention Program, 
COMMUNITY MEDIATION SERVICES OF CENTRAL OHIO, 
https://communitymediation.com/mediation/mediation-for-
individuals/housing_disputes/housing-stabilization-homelessness-prevention-
program.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2020).  
65.  Id. 
66.  Some jurisdictions are passing eviction sealing laws or expungement 
laws to prevent access to eviction filing records unless a judgment is entered 
against the tenant. See Sophie Beiers et al., Clearing the Record: How Eviction 
Sealing Laws Can Advance Housing Access for Women of Color, AMERICAN 
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/news/racial-
justice/clearing-the-record-how-eviction-sealing-laws-can-advance-housing-
access-for-women-of-color/. 
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C. Ethical Challenges  
While helpful in appropriate cases, day-of-trial mediation in the 
eviction context presents an ethical minefield. While ethical 
tensions may be present in some form in all mediations, the enormity 
of the stakes and lopsided bargaining power present in eviction 
mediations strain four ethical principles: impartiality, neutrality, 
party self-determination, and role-slippage. 
1. Impartiality  
Mediators are required to be impartial, in the sense of not having 
any particular connection, sympathy, or identification with one party 
over the other. 67  In eviction cases, mediators might easily find 
themselves rooting for the tenant. This ethical quandary may even 
be baked into the eviction mediation program itself, if it defines its 
mission (officially or behind the scenes) as providing assistance to 
prevent an eviction and avoid homelessness. Conversely, some 
mediators may approach the mediation with the goal of 
accomplishing a payment plan or settlement at all costs. In their 
drive towards settlement, they may put undue pressure on tenants 
and favor the landlord’s business interests in collecting the rent.  
As discussed above, the inherent unbalanced power structure in 
eviction proceedings allows some landlords to pressure tenants into 
non-mediated “hallway” deals. 68   In these non-mediated 
negotiations, tenants have little opportunity to raise their own 
concerns and demands, such as rent abatement, payment plans, or 
repairs.  As one tenant described after a “hallway negotiation” with 
the landlord’s agent: “I tried negotiating. She didn’t want to hear my 
side of the story but agreed to take my payments. Still, we have 
nowhere else to go. I didn’t have a choice.”69 
Mediation might attenuate the concern about imbalanced 
opportunity to negotiate by inserting a professional third-party 
neutral to facilitate the process. Mediators can reshuffle the power 
relations between parties by providing the structure and time for the 
tenant to share her perspective and offer potential solutions. 
However, mediation may add yet another source of pressure on a 
self-represented tenant—a mediator’s desire to maintain a high 
settlement rate. Mediators must check their own settlement statistics 
and ego at the door, and realize that from the tenant’s vantage point, 
no deal might be better than a bad deal. It may be preferable for 
 
67.  AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, AM. BAR ASS’N, AND ASS’N FOR CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION, MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Standard II 
(2005) (defining impartiality as “freedom from favoritism, bias or prejudice”) 
(hereinafter MODEL STANDARDS). 
68.  JUSTICE DIVERTED, supra note 5, at 28-29. 
69.  Id. at 29. 
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some tenants to proceed in court rather than be forced into an 
unrealistic payment plan, or a settlement that exclusively favors the 
landlord.  
2. Neutrality 
Mediator ethical standards require that mediators maintain 
neutrality towards the issues under discussion, with no particular 
view as to how an issue should be resolved, what standards should 
be brought to bear, or who is ‘right.’ 70  Yet, given the lopsided 
bargaining power between self-represented tenants and many 
landlords, the potential for tenant coercion is enormous. Landlords 
also may lack legal knowledge, and may misstate the law during the 
mediation. Mediators might easily feel called upon to intervene by 
informing tenants of their legal rights, advocating for their interests, 
or appealing to landlords’ sense of morality and conscience even 
when these are opposed to their financial interests and clearly stated 
positions. On the flip side, some mediators might inappropriately 
put pressure on tenants to settle for a payment plan, a confessed 
judgment, or other terms that favor the landlord.  
3. Self-determination 
Mediation is premised on the notion of party self-determination, 
often defined as “the act of coming to a voluntary, uncoerced 
decision in which each party makes free and informed choices as to 
process and outcome.” 71  Most tenants, however, lack basic 
information about their legal rights. The landlord may be in a 
position to make “free and informed choices” but most self-
represented tenants are confused, fearful, and desperate to avoid 
homelessness. Even worse, landlords may misrepresent the law 
during the mediation. This put mediators in the Catch-22 of 
remaining neutral, which favors the landlord and coerces the tenant 
to make decisions based on incorrect information, or correcting the 
landlord, which violates neutrality, putting the mediator in the role 
of legal advisor and risking that the mediator may misstate the law 
as well. On the day of trial, tenants are under tremendous 
psychological pressure to agree to any terms presented by the 
landlord to keep a roof over their children’s heads, even if the 
property has housing code violations or needs repairs. The shadow 
cast by the court (which is just down the hall) might loom so darkly 
that it compromises self-determination or essentially negates it.  
 
70.  See Hilary Astor, Mediator Neutrality: Making Sense of Theory and 
Practice, 16 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 221 (2007). 
71.  See MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 67, Standard I. 
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4. Role-slippage  
The ADR field debates the nature of the mediator’s role and the 
essence of the service they provide to the parties: facilitating inter-
party communication or providing case outcome evaluation.72 It is 
widely accepted, however, that mediators are not the parties’ 
lawyers, and that they are not to dispense legal advice or confuse the 
roles of advocate and neutral.73 Nevertheless, in seeking to address 
power imbalances, it is easy to envision mediators providing parties, 
and particularly tenants, information about their rights or 
suggestions for legal maneuvers that would help them procedurally 
or substantively.  
D. Addressing Ethical Concerns  
1. Combined Legal Advice or Navigator-Plus-Mediation Model  
To ensure mediator neutrality and assist tenants in making 
informed, self-determined decisions during a mediation, the ideal 
approach combines mediation with attorneys, ombudsmen, or other 
navigators who can advise tenants about their legal rights or 
represent them during the mediation. Several jurisdictions use this 
combined legal services and mediation approach. For example, a 
local Community Mediation & Restorative Services program in 
Minneapolis, Minnesota offers “housing stability mediation” in 
coordination with the court. The program increases awareness of the 
availability of pre-trial and day-of-trial mediation by including 
information about mediation services on the summons served on the 
tenant. The court facilitates the process by scheduling community 
mediators for every docket. In addition to mediation, tenants receive 
legal advice from volunteer attorneys at the courthouse. Some of the 
attorneys represent tenants during mediation, but most of the tenants 
receive information about their legal rights and then represent 
themselves in mediation.   
In other programs, lawyers are present in the courthouse during 
the eviction docket. In the District Court for Baltimore City, for 
example, a walk-in legal aid office and a tenant advocate from the 
Public Justice Center are present in the courthouse. This 
 
72.  See Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, 
Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 
(1996); Ellen A. Waldman, The Evaluative-Facilitative Debate in Mediation: 
Applying the Lens of Therapeutic Justice, 82 MARQUETTE L. REV. 155 (1999).  
73.  The ethical standard under which this principle falls is “quality of the 
process.” MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 67, Standard VI(A)(5) (stating “[t]he 
role of a mediator differs substantially from other professional roles. Mixing the 
role of a mediator and the role of another profession is problematic and thus, a 
mediator should distinguish between the roles”). 
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theoretically allows mediators to pause the mediation session so 
tenants can seek legal information and advice before agreeing to a 
settlement. Given the time constraints of the docket, however, this 
may not always be realistic.  
Some courts provide non-lawyer “navigators” to help self-
represented tenants respond to failure-to-pay-rent petitions. A study 
of a Navigators Pilot Project in Brooklyn Housing Court found that 
tenants assisted by navigators “were 87 percent more likely than 
unassisted tenants to have their defenses recognized and addressed 
by the court,” and that judges ordered property owners to make 
repairs 50% more often in navigator-assisted cases.74 While lawyers 
are still the preferred approach, navigators could be helpful in a 
mediation program context as well. Navigators perform a triage 
function, helping those tenants who have cognizable legal defenses 
to assert them in court, and assisting others to negotiate agreements 
for rent abatement, payment plans, repairs, or other terms the court 
cannot award.  
Regardless of the model used, programs should not place 
mediators in the dual role of advocate-mediator, or presume that 
parties can process legal standards without the assistance of a lawyer 
or some other type of navigator or ombudsman. One Massachusetts 
eviction prevention mediation program provided a book of legal 
information, dubbed the “authoritative legal resource,” that parties 
could consult during mediation sessions. 75  This approach is not 
advisable. Without interpretation and application to the unique facts 
of the case by legal counsel, statutes are simply confusing words on 
the page. Inevitably, the parties may ask the mediators what the 
information means, which implicates the role-slippage problem 
described above. This approach may also present significant barriers 
for tenants who have limited literacy or language barriers. 
In another Massachusetts program, the mediators were educated 
about the law and expected to provide legal information to  tenants 
during mediations. 76  This approach violates mediator ethical 
standards by putting the mediator in the position of playing the role 
 
74.  REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & THOMAS M. CLARKE, ROLES BEYOND 
LAWYERS, SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW 
YORK CITY COURT NAVIGATORS PROGRAM AND ITS THREE PILOT PROJECTS 4 
(Dec. 2016), 
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/new_york_city_
court_navigators_report_final_with_final_links_december_2016.pdf. The study 
was funded by the American Bar Foundation and the National Center for State 
Courts.  
75.  Joel Krutzberg & Jamie Henikoff, Freeing the Parties from the Law: 
Designing an Interest and Rights Focused Model of Landlord/Tenant Mediation, 
1997 J. DISP. RESOL. 53, 93-94. 
76.  Id. at 111-12. 
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of both attorney and neutral. Mediators and court ADR programs 
should avoid the liability risks inherent in such an approach. 
2. Neutral Protocols and Forms  
Eviction mediation programs should ensure that their protocols 
and standardized forms do not include baked-in biases for a 
particular party. For example, the court in Ramsey County, 
Minnesota developed a form settlement agreement for its eviction 
mediation program. The form includes preprinted boxes that the 
parties and mediators can use to check off provisions of the deal. 
Many of the preprinted categories on the form favor the landlord’s 
interests (dates and amount of rent the tenant will pay). While this 
may provide a framework for negotiating a payment plan, the form 
lacks preprinted sections addressing common tenant interests, such 
as rent reductions or repair agreements.  
Programs must develop neutral forms and practices to ensure 
that the voices, interests, and needs of all parties can be part of the 
process. Forms also should include open-ended portions to allow the 
parties to define the terms appropriate for their situation.  
3. Training for Mediators and Judges  
To address impartiality concerns, programs should provide 
extensive training to mediators. Mediators should understand the 
general legal landscape in which these cases occur and the complex 
psychological dynamics involved in these matters. Mediators should 
know the professional resources available for the parties, and pause 
or conclude the mediation if parties would like to seek information 
or advice before agreeing to a settlement.77 This is most feasible, of 
course, when mediation programs, legal services, and rental 
assistance programs work cooperatively in the same courthouse. 
In addition, judges who preside over eviction cases should be 
educated about the mediation process. Judges who are accustomed 
to resolving eviction cases in a matter of minutes need to understand 
that the mediation process requires significantly more time to play 
out. The mediator needs to explain the process and have the parties 
sign participation agreement forms. The parties then need time to 
tell their respective stories and negotiate a potential resolution. 
While many judges think that mediation is more “efficient” than 
 
77.  Mediator ethical standards encourage mediators to inform the parties of 
their right to consult “other professionals to help them make informed choices.” 
MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 67, Standard I(A)(2). This is often unrealistic in 
the midst of a day-of-trial mediation involving self-represented parties who must 
reach a deal to stop an eviction order. Having legal services and rental assistance 
resources in the same courthouse may help to facilitate informed decision-making 
by the parties.  
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litigation, a quality mediation process will not be faster than the 
typical five-minute judicial hearing in an eviction action. To allow 
time for a quality mediation process, programs should consider 
scheduling the docket so that the parties can first attempt to 
mediate—either at an earlier date or earlier in the morning. If the 
parties do not reach agreement during mediation, the case could 
proceed later in the afternoon or on a different date.   
Courts should not evaluate mediation programs or mediators 
based solely on settlement rates. This creates undue pressure on the 
mediator to violate ethical limits.78 Judges should be educated about 
the mediation process and the goals of the program as well. Judges 
should be encouraged to refer cases to mediation when they think 
appropriate or when the parties request it.79  
Docket efficiency gains from mediation should be evaluated 
over the long term. Research in the small claims context has found 
that if the parties reach agreement in mediation, they may be less 
likely to return to court in the future.80 The study also study found 
that parties who participated in mediation were more likely to report 
that the court cared about them, regardless of whether they reached 
agreement in mediation.81 And, we suggest, efficiency assessments 
should expand beyond immediate docket clearing and take into 
account efficiency benefits of mediation as compared to other 
publicly funded systems beyond the courthouse. If a case takes a 
couple hours to mediate but saves parties dozens of hours of future 
interaction with other public systems (health, homeless services, 
education, employment, etc.), focusing only on judicial resources 
makes little sense, given they are all ultimately funded from the 
same state budget.  
 
78.  The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators provides: “A mediator 
shall not undermine party self-determination by any party for reasons such as 
higher settlement rates, egos, increased fees, or outside pressure from court 
personnel, program administrators, provider organizations, the media or others.” 
MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 67, Standard I(B) (self-determination). 
79.  One of the reported challenges of the rent division ADR pilot in 
Baltimore City, for example, was the lack of referrals to mediation when the 
parties requested mediation. The program is set up such that a landlord or tenant 
must “request” mediation by filling out an orange paper form. The review of the 
pilot found that even when parties had filled out the form requesting mediation, 
some judges simply ignored them and proceeded to the hearing. C-DRUM, supra 
note 44, at 13-14 (noting that about half of the cases in which a party requested 
mediation was referred to mediation by the judge). At a minimum, courts should 
make parties aware of the availability of mediation services and allow them to 
mediate when both wish to do so.  
80.  Charkoudian, Eisenberg, & Walter, supra note 43, at 21 (finding that 
small claims cases that reached agreement in ADR were 21% less likely to return 
to court for enforcement action within one year as compared to cases adjudicated 
by the judge, settled by the parties in the “hallway” without ADR, or not settled 
in ADR).  
81.  Id. at 26. 
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Thus far, we have discussed the benefits that mediation may 
offer to parties and the system even when conducted under 
significant constraints: last minute, in the courthouse, with eviction 
looming, power imbalances at their utmost, and a judge down the 
hall ready to hear the matter. Next, we explore how reducing these 
constraints by implementing mediation before, rather than at, the 
courthouse can offer parties and the “system” far more significant 
benefits. We begin by exploring the potential of pushing this 
intervention back before the sharpest conflict watershed, with 
mediation taking place before the filing of an eviction action. Next, 
we consider moving such intervention even further upstream in the 
rental relationship. 
III. PRE-FILING COMMUNICATION AND MEDIATION  
Some evictions might be prevented if property owners and 
tenants communicated earlier in the life of an emerging problem. 
Tenants may be reluctant to speak up about life circumstances—for 
example, a job loss, unexpected medical cost, or family 
emergency—that imposes a temporary hardship that affects the 
ability to pay rent. Some landlords are willing to work with tenants 
who proactively raise issues and attempt to work out a plan. Tenants 
also may need assistance requesting repairs to the property. 
Emerging technological applications provide tenants with tools to 
facilitate communication about late rent and needed repairs. For 
example, a consortium of law schools and technology companies 
collaborated to design a free, web-based program called “Hello 
Landlord.” The platform assists tenants in generating letters to their 
landlords when they cannot pay the rent or need to request repairs.82 
The program seeks to provide an “upstream solution” that targets “a 
communication gap” when tenants feel powerless or hesitant to 
reach out to landlords about a missing payment or other rental 
issues.83  
When bilateral communications between the property owner and 
tenant fail, the parties may need the assistance of a neutral mediator 
to facilitate their conversations. To be most beneficial for all parties 
involved, mediation should occur well in advance of an eviction 
filing. This reduces sunk costs on the conflict—costs that can 
 
82.  See HELLO LANDLORD, https://hellolandlord.org/about/. The program 
“was created by LawX, the legal design lab at BYU Law School, the Innovation 
for Justice (i4J) Program at the University of Arizona College of Law, and 
SixFifty, the technology subsidiary of the law firm Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & 
Rosati.” Id. 
83.  Landlords Do Not Want Eviction: A New Online Tenant-Landlord 
Communication Tool to Help, RENTAL HOUSING J. (Aug. 7, 2019), 
https://rentalhousingjournal.com/landlords-do-not-want-eviction-a-new-online-
tenant-landlord-communication-tool-to-help/. 
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sometimes challenge resolution even more than the original conflict 
trigger (e.g., late payment of rent) does. Pre-filing mediation also 
helps tenants to avoid a stain on their rental history that could impair 
future housing opportunities. Finally, pre-filing mediation gives the 
parties more time to procure rental assistance and other resources to 
avoid an eviction or plan for a mutually agreeable move out date.  
Pre-filing mediation also offers process flexibility and 
convenience lacking in the court process. Mediations can be 
scheduled at times and locations mutually convenient for the parties, 
including evenings and weekends. This allows the parties to avoid 
taking time off work. Once the case enters the court system, 
scheduling is out of the parties’ hands and a failure to appear can 
result in the loss of one’s case.  
In addition to efficiency and convenience benefits, the mediation 
process itself can model effective communication and problem 
solving and help the parties to build a stronger relationship. In this 
sense, not only does pre-filing mediation resolve the immediate 
problem, it also acts to build constructive patterns for future 
conflicts. Day-of-trial mediation arrives at the end of a sharp 
conflictual interaction and focuses on putting out the presenting fire 
(i.e., non-payment of rent) rather than addressing the range of issues 
important to both parties in the rental relationship.  
IV. UPSTREAM CONFLICT RESOLUTION STRATEGIES 
The complexity of the eviction crisis requires us to think beyond 
the specific dispute resolution process to use in a particular eviction 
case already filed in court. To be sure, adding mediation as a pre-
trial or day-of-trial option may serve as a safety net and provide the 
benefits described above for some parties. But this will not dam the 
river of eviction matters rushing towards adjudication; at best, on its 
own, the effect of these programs is akin to a stone that slightly alters 
the river’s flow. 
Given the complexity of the eviction epidemic, we need to apply 
a wider “ADR lens,” one that does not zoom in on mediating 
eviction cases but rather identifies and addresses brewing problems 
at an earlier stage. Identifying how this wider ADR perspective 
might be helpful requires loosening our focus on eviction conflict 
per se, and instead exploring the underlying sources of conflict, 
which may be structural (systemic poverty and a dysfunctional legal 
process) or relational (patterns of interaction and communication 
between property owners and tenants). Exploring discrete 
interactional stages of the rental relationship through conflict 
analysis and dispute resolution glasses allows us to recognize the 
moments fraught with potential for conflict generation and 
escalation. We also should look beyond the rental relationship itself 
to examine how conflicts in other aspects of the tenant’s life—their 
20
Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice, Vol. 41 [2020], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/policypractice/vol41/iss3/2
2020 Symposium] Eisenberg & Ebner 145 
employment, health, family dynamics, etc.—may lead to adverse 
consequences that put the tenant on a path towards housing 
instability.   
A. Structural Conflicts and Early Intervention Programs 
For many tenants, the source of conflict leading to eviction is 
structural, not relational:84 the tenant simply does not have sufficient 
income or resources to pay the rent. This may be a temporary job 
loss or a sudden medical bill, or it may be more systemic poverty 
and lack of affordable housing options. Given the structural nature 
of the conflict, neither traditional litigation nor mediation will 
address the full scope of the problem. We need policy reforms that 
increase affordable housing, provide rental assistance, and attack the 
systemic causes of poverty.  
Even so, there may be ways to assist tenants at the nascent stages 
of a crisis. Some jurisdictions have developed collaborative 
intervention programs that attempt to address problems at an earlier 
stage to avoid later evictions. These programs seek to reduce 
evictions and homelessness by supporting the tenant in resolving 
non-housing issues (employment, health, etc.) that may later affect 
their ability to pay rent. 
San Francisco’s Conflict Intervention Service (“CIS”) provides 
one of the best examples of an upstream eviction prevention 
program.85 CIS attempts to identify tenants at risk of missing rental 
payments and intervenes early to help the tenant resolve many 
different types of conflicts. CIS broadens the definition of 
“mediation” into problem solving of all kinds. CIS “mediators” help 
tenants resolve conflicts with social service providers and other 
entities to keep the tenant’s housing situation stable.86 Social service 
providers refer tenants to CIS as soon as they encounter difficulties 
that could later affect their financial and housing stability.   
Another Eviction Diversion Program in Kalamazoo, Michigan 
brings together state health and human services, public assistance, 
tenant legal services, nonprofit charitable organizations, and the 
 
84.  Christopher Moore theorizes that conflicts arise from a variety of 
sources, including: structure, data, values, interests, and relationships. 
CHRISTOPHER MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR 
RESOLVING CONFLICT (3d ed. 2004). 
85.  Roger Moss, Conflict Intervention Service: How an Innovative 
Mediation Program Prevents Evictions, BAR ASS’N S.F. (Sept. 26, 2018), 
https://blog.sfbar.org/2018/09/26/conflict-intervention-service-how-an-
innovative-mediation-program-prevents-evictions/. 
86.  These are not “mediators” in the traditional sense. They seem to serve a 
variety of functions—such as ombuds, social worker, navigator, advocate, and 
conflict resolver, depending upon the needs of the tenant. 
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judicial system to provide resources to deter evictions. 87  The 
program attempts to find solutions before an eviction filing, when 
tenants are no more than three months behind on their rent.  
The Program continues to support tenants if the property owner 
ultimately files for eviction. On the day of the hearing, attorneys 
from legal aid or law school clinical law programs conduct intake 
with tenants as they check in for the day’s docket. The tenant 
receives legal advice about her rights and options. An attorney may 
assist the tenant in negotiating a deal with the property owner to 
avoid eviction. Qualified tenants may receive bridge funds to pay 
the rent. The program may help tenants find affordable housing to 
avoid homelessness. Importantly, landlord attorneys and judges are 
typically supportive of the program, which not only helps tenants 
avoid eviction and stay in their homes, but also decreases court 
dockets and the landlord’s expense in pursuing evictions capable of 
resolution. This combination of early intervention work plus legal 
services and mediation at the courthouse has had significant impact: 
eviction judgments in Kalamazoo have decreased by 73% and 
homelessness is down 9%.88  
Beyond early conflict intervention strategies, there are other 
programs which, while not mediation-focused, provide tenant 
services that could be augmented with conflict-specific aims and 
expertise. Amongst these are low-income housing programs that 
take a holistic approach to promoting housing stability for 
vulnerable tenants. 
The non-profit program CommonBond, for example, provides 
support to tenants in order to help them achieve independence in 
three foundational areas: education and advancement, community 
building and engagement, and health and wellness.89 While not a 
mediation program per se, CommonBond emphasizes the need to 
listen to and support residents in navigating complex systems and 
overcoming conflicts in the foundational areas of their lives. There 
may be opportunities to integrate mediation services into programs 
such as CommonBond to help tenants address conflicts as early as 
possible.  
 
87.  According to one report, “[t]he project brings together representatives 
from the Department of Human Services, Legal Aid of Western Michigan, Eighth 
District Court, United Way, the City of Kalamazoo, 2-1-1- and Housing 
Resources, Inc.” a non-profit that assists individuals experiencing a housing crisis. 
Kathy Jennings, Working Together to Keep People in their Homes, SECOND 
WAVE (May 17, 2012), https://www.secondwavemedia.com/southwest-
michigan/features/2lesshomelessness0517.aspx. 
88.  Id. 
89.  See COMMON BOND COMMUNITIES, 
https://commonbond.org/advantage-services/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2020). 
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B. Relational Conflict Escalation 
While many tenants experience eviction as one of the collateral 
consequences of structural poverty, evictions may also result from a 
pattern of conflict interaction between the parties to the rental 
relationship.  
Evictions are not born in the courthouse, nor do they magically 
come into being at the moment the landlord files a court complaint. 
The presenting cause is typically the tenant’s non-payment of rent. 
Inevitably, events, circumstances and conditions occurring long 
before non-payment of rent affected or determined whether rent 
would be paid, as well as whether this would result in an eviction 
action. Some of these events, circumstances, and conditions relate 
to realms familiar to those working in the housing or poverty law 
fields. For example, events related to employment, health, and 
family circumstances feed into an inability to pay rent later down 
the line.90 
Other eviction triggers may relate to patterns of interaction 
between the property owner and tenant. For example, a tenant may 
withhold rent due to a lack of communication or action from the 
landlord to make a promised repair. A landlord may use an eviction 
filing to “communicate” with a tenant who has been avoiding the 
landlord’s calls. A tenant may avoid the landlord’s calls because she 
feels embarrassed to share events happening in her life that may be 
impacting her ability to pay rent.  
Considering the eviction crisis through the lens of conflict 
theory offers a ‘root cause’ approach to understand, first, how 
something becomes a conflict in the first place and, second, how 
conflicts escalate in scope and intensity over time. Taken together, 
these models may help to explain the sources of conflict, which may 
be structural (lack of affordable housing, lack of access to legal 
services, and lack of access to health services, to name a few) or 
interactional (the path from peaceful rental relationships to full-
blown, take-no-prisoners conflict across many contexts). 
Understanding these sources and patterns of conflict may identify 
opportune “off-ramps”—points at which a situation may be resolved 
earlier by addressing the structural or relational tensions causing the 
conflict. 
1. Conflict formation 
Richard Felstiner, William Able, and Austin Sarat have 
theorized that ‘issues’ or ‘problems’ become ‘disputes’ or ‘conflicts’ 
 
90.  For example, a death in the family might incur immediate burial and 
funeral costs, causing the family to fall behind on rent. The impact would be more 
severe if the deceased was a primary wage earner for the family.  
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by going through three stages of transformation, which they dub 
“naming, claiming and blaming.”91  
a. Naming  
The first transformation leading to conflict is the situation’s shift 
from being an “unPIE” to a “PIE”—that is, from an unperceived 
injurious experience, to a perceived injurious experience. 
“Perceiving” an injury means consciously recognizing that 
something harmful has occurred to us. We experience many 
potential slights over the course of a day that we may tune out. 
Imagine walking down a city street and being bumped by others or 
overlooking an unreturned text or phone call. Most of the minor 
harms and distresses we go through in the course of our lives remain 
unPIEs. Recognizing or naming the event and the harm--“I called 
the tenant about the late rent and she is ignoring my calls”--
transforms the slight into a PIE. 
b. Blaming  
The next step along the path to conflict occurs when we attribute 
the PIE to the fault of someone else and believe that they should do 
something to rectify the situation. Your injurious experience has 
transformed into a grievance, which includes blame for the past and 
expectations for the future. However, we may keep this grievance to 
ourselves, rather than continue along the path to conflict. In fact, we 
do so most of the time.92  
c. Claiming  
In some cases, we decide to air our grievance directly to the 
person, entity, or organization we believe to be at fault, and express 
 
91.  William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence 
and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 15 LAW & SOC'Y 
REV. 631 (1981). 
92.  In the legal dispute literature, this is known as ‘lumping it’: having cause 
for a legal claim, but preferring not to pursue it. As the benefits are outweighed 
by the time, costs and effort of pursuing the claim; even if you are sure you will 
win—the odds of which add yet another factor—risk—to the economically driven 
choice of pursuing a conflict. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out 
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 
(1974). The conflict literature provides other reasons for not advancing a claim, 
suggesting that many people are conflict-avoidant and consciously or 
unconsciously refrain from advancing their grievances to the claiming phase. See 
BERNARD MAYER, THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT 42-47(2d ed. 2012). We 
introduce lumping it and conflict avoidance at this transformational stage, as this 
is where it is most common; of course, people who have pursued an issue through 
to the claiming stage often choose to lump legal disputes, or to avoid conflict, 
once it has already fully transformed. 
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our expectation that they take action to remedy the situation. This is 
called claiming. At this point we are on the brink of conflict, but it 
is not fully formed. 
If the landlord confronts the tenant, reprimands them for being 
late with the rent, and demands immediate payment, two paths 
divide. On one path, the tenant responds and pays the rent. On the 
other, the tenant says “I don’t owe you anything—you need to fix 
the leaky roof first, then I’ll pay you rent,” or even, “I don’t have it 
now, I’ll pay you in a week.” Down the first path, the situation is 
defused. All the alternatives on the second path, on the other hand, 
lead to conflict. Conflict comes to life the moment we make a claim, 
and the other party rejects it. Rejecting our claim might take the 
form of saying “No” (or far less polite things) explicitly. It might 
take other forms, such as saying, “I’ll get back to you” and not doing 
so. It might take the form of a counteroffer, which essentially rejects 
our claim before offering something else. 
2. Conflict Escalation 
Once conflict emerges, it typically does not subside or resolve 
on its own. It continues to transform, usually in an escalatory 
fashion.93 Dean Pruitt and Sung Hee Kim94 describe five types of 
transformations that commonly occur as conflict escalates:95 
Conflict turns from light to heavy: Parties sharpen their tactics, 
responding to a previously sharpened tactic by their counterpart. A 
tenant confronts a landlord, requesting repair of the broken light 
fixtures in the hall. The landlord agrees, but fails to fix the lights. 
The tenant begins calling the landlord weekly, then daily. The 
landlord screens the tenant’s calls. The tenant begins leaving  
garbage bags out in the hallway, underneath the light fixtures, rather 
than disposing of them. The landlord notifies the tenant she is in 
behavioral violation of the contract. The tenant writes back that she 
is withholding rent until the light fixtures are repaired.  
Conflict moves from small to large: Single-issue conflicts turn 
into multi-issue conflicts, and as they do, each party incrementally 
 
93.  Escalation, as a term, can express one party using sharper tactics, 
intending to increase the pressure on their counterpart in excess of the pressure 
they experienced at the previous phase. It can also mean that, overall, the intensity 
of the conflict as experienced by both parties and perhaps by all around them has 
risen. These meanings overlap, largely because as one party takes escalatory 
action towards the other, the other responds in kind; the outcome is that the overall 
conflict intensity has risen. See DEAN PRUITT & SUNG HEE KIM, SOCIAL 
CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE, AND SETTLEMENT 88-89 (3d ed. 2004). 
94.  Id. at 88-92. 
95.  Note that these transformations do not all always occur, nor do they 
appear in any particular sequence, but all are commonly observed in conflict. 
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commits increasing resources to the conflict. Consider this scenario: 
a conflict over a few days’ delay in paying the rent transforms as the 
landlord accuses the tenant of a series of behavioral infractions. The 
tenant, in turn, responds by accusing the landlord of failing to fix 
windows that allow cold air and rain to seep in, raising the utility 
bills. The tenant demands that the landlord replace or seal the 
windows and pay for the utility costs. The landlord threatens 
eviction for failing to pay rent. The landlord files for eviction. 
Conflict over specific issues become general conflicts: 
Sometimes a conflict about a single issue snowballs into a much 
larger dispute.  For example, a landlord informs a tenant she has 
received complaints about noise from a neighbor, and he needs to 
keep it down. The tenant tells the landlord to install insulation in the 
paper-thin walls if she wants quiet in the building. The landlord 
informs the tenant she has received multiple complaints about the 
tenant regarding noise and smoke coming from the apartment. The 
tenant calls the landlord a slumlord and starts to ignore the 
landlord’s calls. The landlord files for eviction.  
Parties’ goals shift and orient against the other: At some point 
during a conflict, parties stop perceiving the situation as an attempt 
to better their situation or to prevent the other from harming them. 
Instead, they want to win—to achieve an outcome that betters their 
situation more than the other party’s outcome betters theirs. As 
conflict continues to transform, parties may no longer focus on their 
own outcome or situation at all; instead, they focus on causing or 
maximizing harm to the other party. 
At first, a landlord might file for eviction in hopes of getting 
unpaid back rent, as they need the cash for some repairs around the 
property. When the tenant refuses to pay, the landlord wants to get 
their money back and “teach the tenant a lesson.” By the time they 
reach court, the landlord may want to drag the tenant through the 
legal mud, kick them off the property, and put a mark on their 
permanent record—even though none of this brings them any closer 
to effecting the repairs they had hoped to make.  
The number of people involved grows: Even when a conflict 
begins between two individuals, the number of individuals involved 
tends to multiply over time. Consider this scenario: a property 
manager might bring in the landlord and an attorney to engage with 
a tenant who is behind on their rent. The tenant might involve friends 
and family, housing and welfare services, attorneys, other renters on 
the property, etc. This results in more interactions, more voices, and 
an audience effect that escalates conflict.  
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3. Attribution Theory 
An additional concept known as “attribution theory” is helpful 
for understanding why people make the shift from naming to 
blaming and claiming; as well as for understanding why people tend 
to respond to each other’s moves with more intense escalatory 
tactics.  Attribution theory suggests that our beliefs—conscious or 
unconscious—about why another person took the action he did 
influence our interpretation of and response to that action.96 
One commonly encountered pattern is called “false attribution 
error”:  when someone does something that harms us, we tend to 
attribute her actions to her disposition or character, rather than her 
circumstances.97 For example, when a tenant fails to pay rent, the 
landlord is likely to assume that the tenant is a freeloader, rather than 
consider whether the delay is due to an unfortunate hardship.  
A closely related judgmental pattern is called “actor/observer 
bias”: we tend to ascribe our own harm-causing actions to our 
circumstances, whereas we ascribe others’ actions, similar as they 
may be, to their character.98 If I, as a landlord, fix a broken water 
heater two weeks after the date by which I promised to do it, I will 
explain to myself that this reasonable delay happened because I was 
very busy and had a lot of work to do. But if my tenant pays the rent 
two weeks late, I may view this as ugly behavior that stems from his 
poor character.  
Another form of attribution is “negative or sinister attribution,”99 
which occurs when someone does something that harms us, and we 
ascribe this harm not to circumstances, and not even to their 
character, but to their intent. We assume that the actor was targeting 
us, specifically, and that their motive was malevolent. For example, 
if our tenant does not pay the rent on time, we might not attribute 
this to their circumstances or even to their character as, for example, 
lazy freeloaders. Instead, we may perceive that they did this because 
they are out to harm us in particular, seeking to make us miss our 
mortgage payment or go into bankruptcy. 
Returning to the conflict formation and escalation patterns 
discussed above, it is easy to see how attribution plays a role in 
 
96.  For discussion of the different types of attribution mentioned in this 
section, see Keith G. Allred, Anger and Retaliation in Conflict: The Role of 
Attribution, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 236 (Morton Deutsch 
& Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000). 
97.  Id. 
98.  Id. 
99.  For discussion of this form of attribution, see Roderick Kramer, The 
Sinister Attribution Error: Paranoid Cognition and Collective Distrust in Groups 
and Organizations, 18 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 199 (1994); see also Barbara 
Lopes et al., Coping with Perceived Abusive Supervision: The Role of Paranoia, 
26 J. LEADERSHIP & ORG. STUD. 237 (2019). 
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moving the conflict along the formation and escalation spiral. When 
someone does something that harms us, we may attribute it to their 
poor character or hostile intent. As a result, it is hard to consider not 
blaming them, and not airing our grievances and demands. 
Moreover, when we experience someone else’s escalatory behavior, 
we are pre-wired to interpret this not as a rational defense to our own 
previous escalation; rather, we are conditioned to see it as proof that 
the other person sought to harm us intentionally, out of the hostility 
they bear towards us. Naturally, our next move is likely to ratchet 
up the conflict even more. And remember—even as attribution 
carries us through these transformations, it is doing the same thing 
to our counterpart. 
4. Opportunities for Upstream Relational Conflict Intervention 
In our working session at the symposium, 100  we asked 
participants in the group (which included field workers in housing 
and poverty support agencies, attorneys representing tenants and 
corporate landlords, court staff and housing court referees) to share 
some common stories leading to eviction based on real or an 
aggregation of real cases. During this conversation, many 
participants emphasized the number of evictions that could be 
avoided if landlords received training in basic conflict resolution 
skills. 
Participants stressed that it is imperative for landlords to 
understand the value of establishing positive communication and 
problem-solving relationships with tenants. They suggested that 
different jurisdictions could provide these trainings as a condition of 
granting a rental license. The participants emphasized that landlords 
should be educated about the potential benefits of using mediation 
and other conflict resolution interventions at the earliest possible 
stage.  
One study found that landlords and property managers serially 
use the eviction process and the threat of eviction as a means of debt 
collection, not to regain possession of the property.101 If landlords 
 
100.  This article was written as part of the Mitchell-Hamline School of Law 
2019 Symposium, An Intentional Conversation about ADR Interventions: 
Eviction, Poverty, and Other Collateral Consequences. The participants in our 
group included attorneys representing tenants and property owners, judges and 
housing court personnel, non-profit service providers, and anti-poverty 
organizations. 
101.  Philip M.E. Garboden & Eva Rosen, Serial Filing: How Landlords Use 
the Threat of Eviction, 18 CITY & COMMUNITY 638 (2019). The housing laws in 
some jurisdictions provide an incentive for the landlord to file for eviction as early 
as possible, rather than work things out with the tenant. For example, in Baltimore 
City, the tenant’s right to redeem (or “pay to stay” in) the property is foreclosed 
after four eviction judgments. This may encourage landlords to rack up at least 
 
28
Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice, Vol. 41 [2020], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/policypractice/vol41/iss3/2
2020 Symposium] Eisenberg & Ebner 153 
understood that non-court conflict resolution processes could help 
them communicate with tenants and facilitate feasible payment 
schedules, that might decrease the use of the court eviction process 
as a rent collection mechanism. 
In addition to landlord education, the symposium participants 
identified key points along the lifespan of the rental relationship that 
had high conflict potential. Timely intervention at these stages might 
de-escalate conflict, address problems at an earlier stage, and 
prevent a later missed rent payment or eviction filing.   
The chart found at Appendix A summarizes the collective 
thinking of our session participants, as well as some after-the-fact 
application of the conflict dynamics theory described above, to the 
stages in the rental relationship ripe for conflict interventions or 
mediation. At these points, party communication could be 
facilitated, expectations could be clarified, questions could be 
posed, problems could be addressed, and cooperative 
communication could develop and be nurtured. Combined, these 
present a map of the conflict generation, escalation, prevention, and 
resolution potential identified at each stage of rental relationship.  
For many—perhaps most—tenants affected by the eviction 
crisis, the systemic problem leading to the missed rental payment is 
structural poverty and lack of affordable housing, not necessarily a 
pattern of conflict escalation with the property owner or its agents. 
Even in these circumstances, however, earlier communication about 
emerging financial problems or repair issues may help the parties 
de-escalate conflicts, connect them with resources and rental 
assistance, and prevent later eviction filings.  
V. CONCLUSION 
While neither traditional litigation nor mediation approaches 
alone can fully address the eviction epidemic, a coordinated 
response that integrates early conflict intervention services and 
mediation options may help to prevent many evictions. In addition, 
both parties in the rental relationship, especially landlords, should 
be educated about how their patterns of interaction in the early 
stages of the rental relationship and as problems arise have the 
potential to escalate conflict in destructive ways. Likewise, tenants 
need education and support to facilitate early communication and 
problem solving with property owners as soon as problems in any 
aspect of their lives emerge that may later impact their housing 
stability.   
Finally, courts, eviction prevention programs, tenant advocates, 
and property owner associations should collaborate with community 
 
three eviction judgments, giving them greater power to remove a tenant upon a 
fourth filing. 
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mediation and law school ADR programs to identify opportunities 
for the integration of conflict de-escalation measures. Early 
mediation and conflict intervention strategies may help to alleviate 
the need for eviction filings in the first place, and resolve such cases 
in ways that avoid the devastating systemic impacts of eviction for 
families and the larger community.   
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APPENDIX A: OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONFLICT INTERVENTION IN 
THE LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP 
Stage Description  Conflict 
potential 
Internal 
Opportunities 
External 
Interventions  
Showing 
the property 
The owner or 
its agent 
(hereinafter 
“landlord”) 
shows the 
residence to 
the 
prospective 
tenant. The 
landlord 
points out the 
benefits of 
the property 
and its 
facilities, and 
gauges the 
viewer and 
their 
suitability. 
The viewer 
assesses the 
residence’s 
suitability. 
Parties on 
their best 
behavior, 
rather than 
sharing 
realities. 
Landlord 
“selling” 
property, 
glossing over 
flaws, 
making 
promises to 
fix, etc.  
Asymmetric 
information 
exists. The 
tenant may 
not 
understand 
their rights or 
know what 
questions to 
ask.  
Discussion 
centers on 
everything 
going right, 
not on what 
can go wrong 
Opportunity to 
share 
information  
Opportunity for 
tenant 
education about 
general legal 
rights and 
questions to 
consider at this 
stage  
Application 
submission 
The 
prospective 
tenant 
generally 
fills out a 
questionnaire 
and provides 
personal 
information. 
Often, the 
tenant pays a 
non-
refundable 
application 
fee. The 
landlord 
reviews the 
application 
This process 
serves only 
the 
landlord’s 
interests, 
causes 
information 
imbalance, 
and is funded 
by tenant.  
Tenant 
invests effort 
in filling out 
forms, 
money, and 
time waiting 
for response 
 Housing 
referral 
agencies could 
vet landlords, 
or collect 
reputation 
information, 
and publish it, 
to balance 
information.  
Online landlord 
reputation sites 
could be 
supported and 
improved. 
Specifically, 
such sites could 
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and/or 
submits it to 
a tenant 
screening 
agency for a 
review of the 
tenant’s 
history, etc. 
at this stage. 
These sunk 
costs weaken 
their 
negotiation 
power and 
reduce their 
tendency to 
withdraw in 
the face of 
poor 
conditions or 
practices.  
Bad-apple 
landlords use 
this stage as 
a money-
making 
opportunity
—screen 
applicants 
one at a time, 
accept the 
first who 
passes, keep 
the rest of the 
fees even if 
rest of 
applicants 
are not 
screened.  
provide 
information on 
application-fee 
scams.  
Passage and 
enforcement of 
laws to prevent 
application fee 
scams. 
 
 
 
Lease 
negotiation 
The landlord 
provides a 
form 
contract, 
filling in 
most of the 
details—e.g. 
rental term, 
rent, security 
deposit, and 
other 
terms—
themselves.  
 
Lease is 
contract of 
adhesion and 
tenants have 
little to no 
power to 
negotiate, but 
may be able 
to ask for 
accommoda-
tion on 
Information 
imbalance 
One-time vs. 
experienced 
landlord  
One sided: 
Tenant’s 
duties,  
landlord 
rights 
Tendency to 
focus on 
positional 
bargaining, 
or no 
realistic 
opportunity 
for tenant to 
negotiate 
Opportunity to 
put tenant-
specific 
information in 
the lease—e.g., 
date of rent 
payment; 
Opportunity to 
clarify process 
for early 
problem 
solving   
Housing 
advocates and 
referral 
agencies could 
review specific 
contracts to 
provide advice. 
They could 
maintain a 
collection of 
leases landlords 
use, and advise 
tenants about 
potential 
unlawful 
clauses and 
points worthy 
of negotiation 
Community 
mediation 
centers could 
offer lease 
negotiation 
assistance, 
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specific 
issues (e.g. 
rent payment 
date) 
during which 
parties could 
clarify 
expectations, 
define a process 
for resolving 
disputes, and 
raise issues. 
Handover 
of keys 
The new 
tenant 
receives the 
keys and the 
right to 
inhabit the 
home. 
Sometimes, 
this is done 
at a joint 
meeting at 
the home, 
other times 
in a property 
management 
office.  
This might 
be the first 
time the 
tenant sees 
actual home. 
May have 
been 
promised a 
different 
unit. Perhaps 
repairs or 
maintenance 
were not 
completed, 
or housing 
code 
violations 
exist. Tenant 
may attribute 
bad motives 
to the 
landlord  
This is a 
significant 
moment in the 
relationship. 
Landlords 
could enact 
rituals and 
processes 
aimed at 
enhancing trust, 
mutual 
responsibility, 
and ongoing 
communication 
throughout the 
relationship. 
Housing 
agencies could 
develop a 
checklist for 
documentation 
of repair issues 
upon move-in, 
to be provided 
to tenants and 
landlords.  
Landlords 
should develop 
early conflict 
resolution 
protocols to 
encourage 
tenants to raise 
issues as soon 
as possible 
Courts should 
educate 
landlords and 
tenants about 
available 
mediation 
services from 
the court, law 
school clinics, 
or community 
mediation 
programs  
First 
problem 
report by 
tenant 
At some 
point during 
the rental, the 
tenant 
approaches 
the landlord 
to raise an 
issue or 
make a 
request. This 
name, blame, 
claim process 
might be a 
reminder of 
promises 
From 
landlord’s 
perspective, 
this is the 
first 
opportunity 
to label the 
tenant as a 
“trouble-
maker,” or to 
establish 
patterns of 
open 
communica-
tion and 
Opportunity to 
improve 
property, to 
overcome a 
challenging 
moment, to 
review the 
lease, to 
communicate 
and resolve 
issues as they 
arise 
Early 
intervention 
programs that 
help tenants 
communicate 
issues to 
landlords in 
constructive 
ways, and that 
also protect 
their legal 
rights by 
providing 
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made in the 
showing or 
the lease 
negotiation 
that have yet 
to be 
fulfilled, a 
maintenance 
issue, a 
complaint 
about another 
tenant on the 
property, or 
anything 
else. 
problem-
solving  
First time 
landlord 
stands to 
spend/lose 
directly on 
this tenant. 
The topic 
may be one 
not 
specifically 
mentioned in 
the lease, or 
be a matter 
of 
perception. 
Landlord 
rejection of 
the claim 
instigates 
conflict, 
which might 
escalate. 
record of 
communication 
Online 
communication 
support 
programs, such 
as “Hello 
Landlord” 
First 
problem 
report by 
landlord 
(other than 
demand for 
rent) 
The landlord 
approaches 
the tenant to 
raise an issue 
or make a 
request. This 
might be a 
reminder of 
promises 
made in the 
showing or 
the lease 
negotiation 
that have not 
been 
fulfilled, a 
request to 
maintain the 
premises in a 
better 
condition 
(e.g., noise, 
trash, yard, 
smoking, 
parking) 
 
The topic 
may be one 
not 
specifically 
mentioned in 
the lease, or 
be a matter 
of 
perception. 
The tenant 
may feel in 
the right, and 
the landlord 
may rely on a 
power-based, 
command 
approach  
Tenant might 
feel third 
parties are to 
blame for the 
situation.  
Tenant 
rejection of 
the claim 
instigates 
conflict, 
Opportunity to 
improve 
property, to 
overcome a 
challenging 
moment, to 
review the 
lease, to 
establish 
constructive 
problem 
solving.  
Opportunity to 
convene 
conversations 
involving 
others and 
reach group 
understandings.  
Landlord 
certification 
can require 
basic 
communication 
and conflict 
resolution 
training and 
make landlord 
aware of 
community 
supports for 
difficult 
conversations, 
such as 
community 
mediation 
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which might 
escalate.  
First broken 
promise on 
either side 
This may 
precede the 
events 
described 
above, or 
follow them. 
It is a general 
catch-all 
name for the 
first 
occurrence of 
a promise 
being 
broken, or 
perceived as 
being 
broken. This 
could be a 
late rent 
payment, a 
delay of 
handing over 
the keys, a 
failure to 
show up on 
time and fix 
something, 
or anything 
else.  The 
focus here is 
on the breach 
of a promise 
or lease 
provision, 
not its 
reporting to 
the other 
party.  
Triggering of 
the conflict 
“name and 
blame” spiral 
The party 
who feels 
wronged now 
views the 
other party in 
a different 
light 
(negative 
attribution). 
This changes 
their 
perception 
not only of 
the harmful 
act, but of 
the other’s 
character, 
intentions, 
trustworthine
ss, or 
integrity.  
 
 
Opportunity to 
initiate a 
conversation, to 
consult outside 
experts 
(lawyers), to 
ask an outsider 
to intervene.  
Landlord 
certification 
can require 
basic conflict 
resolution 
training and 
make landlord 
aware of 
community 
supports for 
difficult 
conversations, 
such as 
community 
mediation 
Lease can 
clarify conflict 
resolution 
processes, 
including 
mediation 
Late notice  The tenant 
has not paid 
rent on time, 
and has 
received 
notice in 
some form 
(letter, text, 
angry call 
from 
landlord) that 
they must 
pay by 
certain date 
or legal 
action may 
be pursued  
False, 
negative, or 
sinister 
attribution 
error kicks in 
on the 
landlord’s 
side with the 
missed 
payment; it 
may kick in 
on the 
tenant’s side 
with the late 
notice, 
especially if 
the tenant 
perceives the 
The moment of 
demand is also 
a moment to 
defuse: In this 
typical name, 
blame, claim 
situation, 
conflict can be 
avoided by 
handing over a 
check, or 
apprising the 
landlord of 
special 
circumstances 
and agreeing to 
Lease can 
clarify grace 
period for rent 
due date and 
process for 
notifying the 
landlord of the 
need for special 
accommodation
s in the event of 
hardship 
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landlord’s 
demand as 
hostile 
The standard 
wording of 
the notice 
might 
include some 
ominous 
threat of 
legal 
proceedings 
or ‘full 
extent of the 
law’. 
Ominous 
meanings 
might be 
read into 
benign 
wording.  
alternative 
payment date. 
Eviction 
preparation 
The landlord 
prepares the 
paperwork 
necessary for 
eviction or 
hires and 
attorney or 
agent to do 
so for them.  
Investment—
time, money 
or both—in 
the eviction 
proceeding.  
The conflict 
may have 
been handed 
over to 
someone else 
(an agent or 
lawyer), and 
involving 
their set of 
interests 
makes it 
harder to 
walk things 
back.  
Tenant 
initiatives 
might be 
ignored by 
the landlord: 
“It’s out of 
my hands.” 
At this point, 
eviction 
preparers might 
review tenant’s 
record to see if 
this is isolated 
incident or on-
going pattern 
Opportunity for 
mediation or 
early conflict 
intervention 
services to 
identify the 
cause of the 
late payment, 
especially if 
first-time 
incident 
Opportunity to 
connect tenant 
with rental 
assistance or 
other resources 
Opportunity to 
negotiate 
agreement for 
payment plan, 
repair timeline 
(if applicable), 
or specific 
move out date 
if on-going 
affordability 
issue 
Eviction 
filing & 
tenant 
notification 
The landlord 
or their agent 
files the 
eviction 
action 
More time 
and money 
has been 
invested, and 
there are by 
Opportunity for 
mediated 
conversation 
Court forms 
should include 
information 
about local 
mediation or 
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(summary 
ejectment, 
unlawful 
detainer, etc.) 
with the 
court.  
The tenant 
receives 
notice of the 
eviction 
proceeding 
from the 
court. They 
share the 
news with 
others, 
receive 
advice and 
opinions, and 
perhaps seek 
out more 
expert 
advice. 
now 
additional 
conflict facts 
on the 
ground. 
Landlord 
may be 
surprised 
when tenant 
avoids their 
calls and 
does not pay 
rent even 
after eviction 
action filed. 
Tenant, in 
turn, is 
insulted by 
the eviction 
filing and 
vows to 
withhold rent 
and/or file a 
counterclaim. 
Receiving 
the notice is 
experienced 
as sharp 
conflict 
escalation.  
False, 
negative, 
and/or 
sinister 
attribution 
error kick in 
on the 
tenant’s side. 
Tenants 
might receive 
sympathy but 
bad advice. 
They might 
be 
empowered 
to take 
unhelpful 
action, or 
discouraged 
from taking 
helpful 
action.   
prior to trial 
date 
conflict 
intervention 
services and 
rental 
assistance 
programs for 
tenants 
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Tenant is 
likely to 
counter-
escalate, 
such as by 
vowing to 
withhold rent 
to save for 
new place, or 
preparing to 
raise housing 
violations as 
counterclaim 
The 
investment of 
the filing fee 
has made 
non-eviction 
solutions less 
appealing to 
the landlord 
(This is 
called “The 
$400 
problem,” in 
Minnesota 
due to the 
high cost of 
filing; other 
jurisdictions 
have low 
filing fees 
(e.g., $15 in 
Maryland), 
making 
eviction 
actions a low 
cost 
proposition 
for 
landlords). 
Waiting 
period 
This is a 
period of a 
few days or 
1-2 weeks, 
until the case 
is due to be 
heard in 
court. 
In this 
period, both 
sides 
ruminate on 
the situation, 
attributing 
bad motives 
to the other 
side. This 
stewing 
might seek 
outlet, 
unlikely to 
Opportunity for 
mediated 
conversation 
prior to trial 
date 
Court forms 
should include 
information 
about local 
mediation or 
conflict 
intervention 
services and 
rental 
assistance 
programs for 
tenants. Rental 
assistance 
programs 
should not 
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be 
constructive.  
require formal 
eviction court 
order as 
prerequisite for 
assistance. 
Courthouse 
steps 
negotiation 
/ day-of-
trial 
mediation 
At the 
courthouse, 
parties meet, 
presenting a 
natural 
opportunity 
for 
negotiation.  
In some 
jurisdictions, 
parties are 
sent/offered 
to participate 
in a 
mediation-
ish process 
before the 
hearing. 
Extreme 
power 
imbalance. 
Tenant 
operating out 
of fear of 
eviction, or 
anger about 
condition of 
property due 
to landlord’s 
failure to 
repair, or 
shame at 
being sued 
when the 
problem 
stems from 
structural 
poverty or 
other crises 
in their lives 
(health, 
domestic 
violence). 
Tenant may 
be pressured 
into 
“hallway” 
deals with 
landlord’s 
agent, with 
no 
opportunity 
to discuss 
their own 
concerns and 
needs or 
negotiate 
terms 
favorable to 
them 
Opportunity for 
day-of-trial 
mediation, 
combined with 
availability of 
tenant legal 
services or 
navigators to 
advise tenants 
of their rights 
and potential 
resources 
Establishment 
of day-of-trial 
mediation 
programs, 
combined with 
legal 
information and 
services and 
tenant 
resources 
Hearing  Parties 
appear before 
a judge or 
referee. In 
contrast to 
many other 
civil 
procedures 
Tenant is 
marginalized 
and may not 
understand 
the process 
or her legal 
rights.   
Judges have 
opportunity to 
educate parties 
about available 
courthouse 
programs 
(mediation and 
legal services) 
Establishment 
of day-of-trial 
mediation 
programs, 
combined with 
legal 
information and 
services and 
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and to small 
claims, in 
most 
jurisdictions 
this is a very 
short 
procedure, 
focusing on 
whether 
payment was 
made; little-
to-no effort 
is made on 
bringing 
parties to an 
agreed-upon 
resolution.   
Tenant 
viewed as the 
offender/ 
debtor. 
Tenant 
attempts to 
share her 
side of the 
story; may be 
interrupted or 
rejected as 
irrelevant.  
Landlord or 
its agent sees 
judge as 
partner in 
labeling 
tenant as 
shamed 
debtor, 
pressuring 
tenant to pay 
rent or get 
evicted  
and refer 
appropriate 
cases to 
mediation 
tenant 
resources 
Schedule 
docket later in 
day so parties 
may attempt 
mediation prior 
to the hearing 
Post hearing 
/ agreement 
compliance 
Whether the 
proceeding 
ended in 
judgment or 
an 
agreement, 
parties 
comply (or 
do not) with 
the outcome. 
Over the 
course of the 
period until 
compliance, 
they may 
interact with 
each other 
numerous 
times. Even 
if the 
outcome is 
the tenant 
vacating the 
home, this 
may not 
happen 
immediately. 
If parties do 
not comply, 
the potential 
for conflict 
returns and 
snowballs. 
Parties have 
more broken 
promises to 
each other 
than they did 
the first time 
around and 
their trust has 
diminished.  
Attribution 
dynamics 
flourish in 
this 
atmosphere, 
and conflict 
escalation 
might occur 
rapidly. 
 The parties can 
discuss the 
inclusion of 
mediation or 
other conflict 
resolution 
processes in 
their settlement  
agreements, 
whether 
upstream or on 
day-of-trial. 
Make available 
information 
about local 
mediation or 
conflict 
intervention 
services and 
rental 
assistance 
programs in the 
courthouse and 
mediation 
rooms, in the 
hopes that 
people will 
utilize them as 
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a first resort in 
the future.  
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